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In 2004, Judith Miller, a reporter for the New York Times, spent
85 days in jail for refusing to reveal her confidential source to a federal
grand jury investigating the leak of CIA agent Valerie Plame's identity.1
2The case made headlines across the country and renewed the debate
over whether the First Amendment provides reporters any protection
from government inquiry into their methods of newsgathering. The D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals held that Miller had no First Amendment
privilege that would allow her to refuse to identify the government
official who leaked to her the fact that Valerie Plame was a CIA agent.3
Less known is Miller's involvement in a similar case concerning
a news story regarding Islamic charities on which she reported in 2001.
In that case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals allowed Special
Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2008.
1. Judith Miller, My Four Hours Testifying in the Federal Grand Jury Room,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, at A31.
2. See, e.g., Carol D. Leoning, Times Reporter's Testimony Sought; Prosecutor
Tries to Force Cooperation, WASH. POST, July 6, 2005, at A3; Op-Ed., OUR TURN;
A Journalist Sits in Jail; a Basic Right is Shackled, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Sept. 19, 2005, at 4B; Michael Sneed, The Libby case and the Miller mess, CHI.
SuN-TMES, March 17, 2006, at 04.
3. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1138, 1141 (D.C.
Cir. 2006). Under pressure from Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald, who was
investigating whether the leaks were criminal, several other reporters revealed the
identities of sources to whom they had promised confidentiality. At Fitzgerald's
request, administration officials signed releases authorizing reporters to reveal any
conversations they had with the officials. Miller, however, refused to reveal her
source, fearing that the government-obtained releases were coerced. See Miller,
supra note 1, at A31.
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Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald 4 to subpoena the New York Times' telephone
records in order to locate the sources of leaks to Miller and another
Times reporter concerning impending government raids on Islamic
charities suspected of ties to terrorist activities.5
The two cases demonstrate a troublesome pattern. Relying on
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg v. Hayes,6 the
D.C. and Second Circuits declined to recognize a First Amendment
privilege that would allow reporters to refuse to reveal their confidential
sources before a grand jury. This narrow interpretation of Supreme
Court precedent erroneously failed to accord Miller and her fellow
reporters the level of constitutional protection necessary for the media to
fulfill its role as a facilitator of the democratic process. While the
reporters' questionable behavior arguably justifies the Second Circuit's
holding, the D.C. Circuit's holding failed to account for the important
public interests being served by reporting on matters essential to
evaluating government-namely, the effectiveness of America's
intelligence and national security efforts. Decisions such as these put the
public's access to information from confidential government sources at
risk and, more importantly, hinder the media's ability to fulfill its
constitutional role as a check on government power. The courts should
thus adopt a new test for recognizing a reporter's privilege that better
facilitates the media's constitutionally protected role in the democratic
process while recognizing that certain government interests may
outweigh a reporter's First Amendment privilege to maintain
confidentiality.
Although there is little consensus regarding the precise contours
intended by the Press Clause,7 the very fact that the Framers referenced
4. This is the same Patrick Fitzgerald who subpoenaed Miller's testimony in
the Valerie Plame leak investigation.
5. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006).
6. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
7. U.S. CONST. amend I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of... the press .... "). American courts have never taken the position that
the First Amendment gives the press unfettered freedom. One attorney has
described "freedom of the press" as an "evolving concept ... that is informed by the
perception of those who crafted the press clause ... and by the views of Supreme
Court justices who have interpreted that clause" amidst the changing technology of
the media. Lee Levine, First Amendment Center, Press Overview, http://www.first
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the press independently suggests that they at least intended some level of
augmented protection outside that given to ordinary citizens by the
Speech Clause.8 What does seem clear is that the Framers intended for
the Press Clause to protect an institution that enables citizens to make
informed judgments when participating in the democratic process.9 The
Supreme Court has recognized this role of the press, one Justice noting
that:
Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively
expose deception in government. And paramount
among the responsibilities of a free press is the
duty to prevent any part of the government from
deceiving the people and sending them off to
amendmentcenter.org/Press/overview.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2007). See generally
Margaret A. Blanchard, Filling in the Void. Speech and Press in State Courts prior
to Gitlow, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE
MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS 14 (Bill F. Chamberlain and Charlene
J. Brown, eds., 1982) (documenting the early court interpretations of the Press
Clause as it developed in state courts).
In fact, the Founding Fathers themselves may not have agreed on the meaning
of the Press Clause. As one historian notes:
It is not even certain that the framers themselves knew what
they had in mind. Most probably, few clearly understood
what they meant by the free press clause. It is even
doubtful that those few agreed except in a generalized way,
and it is equally doubtful that they represented a consensus.
PATRICK M. GARRY, THE AMERICAN VISION OF A FREE PRESS: AN HISTORICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISIONIST VIEW OF THE PRESS AS A MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 17
(1990).
8. U.S. CONST. amend I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech .... "). It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has
never expressly given the Press Clause any independent significance from the
Speech Clause. GARRY, supra note 7, at 3.
9. Thomas Jefferson, for example, argued that the flow of information between
the people and the government was vital to the success of the government. Jefferson
said that "were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without
newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to
prefer the latter. But I mean that every man should receive these papers, and be
capable of reading them." MAURICE R. CULLEN, JR., MASS MEDIA & THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUES, PROBLEMS, AND PRACTICES 38
(1981).
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distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign
shot and shell.' 0
Similarly, the Court noted in 1978 that its precedent
"emphasize[s] the special and constitutionally recognized role of [the
press] in informing and educating the public, offering criticism, and
providing a forum for discussion and debate."' "l Having thus recognized
the constitutional role granted to the press, some precedent, including
Branzburg, provides support for the idea that Press Clause protections
ought to be balanced against competing governmental interests on a case-
by-case basis, rather than rejected by a per se rule of inapplicability. In
balancing these interests, courts should focus on responsible exercise of
journalism that fosters the media's role in the democratic process. That
is, in order to enjoy certain First Amendment protections, the media-as
agents of the democratic process-may have certain reciprocal
responsibilities. If a journalist acts in accordance with her constitutional
role, she should be entitled to a qualified First Amendment privilege
against compelled disclosure of her source. Once it applies, this
privilege should only be overcome when an asserted governmental
interest in locating her source outweighs the public's interest in
unimpeded newsgathering.
This Note examines the way in which courts do and should
balance the interests of a free press against other concerns-especially
national security-using the two cases involving Judith Miller as
relevant examples. Part I reviews the Supreme Court's decision in
Branzburg and subsequent lower court cases that have relied on that
precedent. Part II discusses the two recent D.C. and Second Circuit
cases involving Judith Miller. Part III crafts a different approach to
resolving issues when the government subpoenas reporters to reveal their
sources, offering practical solutions rooted in First Amendment
jurisprudence that would better protect public interests served by the
Press Clause. Finally, Part IV applies this new test to the two Judith
Miller cases and demonstrates that while the decision in the Valerie
Plame leak case may have been wrongly decided, the decision involving
10. New York Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers Case), 403
U.S. 713, 715 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
11. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 (1978) (alteration
added).
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her reporting on Islamic charities appears to have been correct in its
result, although the same result can be achieved in a way that gives more
value to the First Amendment protections it burdens.
I. BRANZBURG V. HAYES: CONTROLLING PRECEDENT IN SOURCE
PROTECTION
In 1972 the Supreme Court addressed for the first (and so far,
only) time whether reporters have First Amendment protections
regarding their confidential sources. In Branzburg v. Hayes,12 the Court
heard the consolidated cases of three reporters subpoenaed by grand
juries. Each grand jury was investigating crimes allegedly committed by
confidential sources, which prosecutors believed the reporters had
witnessed. 13 One reporter, Branzburg, had been subpoenaed regarding
two news stories he had written. The first focused on two drug dealers
who were making hashish from marijuana, and was accompanied by a
picture of their work showing only their hands.' 4  Branzburg was
subpoenaed by a grand jury to identify the two individuals. 15 The second
subpoena sought Branzburg's testimony regarding sales and use of
illegal drugs the reporter had allegedly witnessed after spending two
weeks investigating a local drug scene by speaking to many drug users
and observing some drug use. 16 In the second case, a reporter named
Pappas had been allowed entry into a Massachusetts Black Panthers
headquarters located in an area barricaded due to civil disorder. 17 The
Panthers had only given him access in return for a promise of
confidentiality. 18 He was later subpoenaed by a grand jury to testify
about what he had witnessed inside the headquarters.' 9 In the third case,
another reporter named Caldwell was subpoenaed by a federal grand jury
12. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
13. Id. at 667-79.
14. Id. at 667-68.
15. Id. at 668.
16. Id. at 669.
17. Id. at 672.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 673.
20071 CONFIDENTIAL SO UR CES 437
438 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 5
concerning his interviews with Black Panthers officers and spokespeople
20in which they had discussed the group's goals and activities.
Branzburg's and Pappas' motions to quash had been denied by
the lower courts, while Caldwell's had been granted insofar as it
protected him from identifying his sources by name. 2 1 He was still
required under the lower court's ruling to testify as to what he witnessed,
but he did not have to identify his confidential sources. 2 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari on all three cases, and the cases were
consolidated. Each reporter relied on the freedom of the press under the
First Amendment to gather and disseminate news-an activity they
argued would be chilled by the resulting hesitance of potential sources to
speak to members of the media if reporters were forced to identify their
confidential sources to the government.
23
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the First Amendment did
not provide reporters a testimonial privilege from appearing before a
24grand jury. Nor were prosecutors required to make any preliminary
25
showing as to the necessity or relevancy of the reporter's testimony.
The Court reached this decision not by focusing on the role of journalism
in a democratic society, but rather by framing the issue on the
importance of the grand jury to the American judicial system and the
26duty of all citizens to participate in the criminal justice process. The
Court justified its decision by noting that denying protection for
confidential sources does not involve "restraint on what the newspapers
may publish or on the type or quality of information reporters may seek
to acquire, nor does it threaten the vast bulk of confidential relationships
between reporters and their sources.
27
The reporters essentially argued that if they were forced to break
their promises of confidentiality to their sources, such sources would no
28longer agree to talk to the press. This in turn would chill the news-
20. Id. at 675.
21. Id. at 667-69.
22. Id. at 677-79.
23. Id. at 679-81.
24. Id. at 690.
25. Id. at 701.
26. Id. at 686.
27. Id. at 691.
28. Id. 679-80.
gathering function of the press. The Court gave little weight to this
argument, calling such fears "speculative."2 9  It acknowledged that the
reporters' concerns were not irrational and that there was evidence of
such a chilling effect. 30 However, the Court was dissatisfied because
there was no clear measure of the extent of the effect.31 Ironically, the
Court proceeded with a seemingly speculative justification of its own for
denying a privilege to reporters. It stated that "quite often, such
informants are members of a minority political or cultural group that
relies heavily on the media to propagate its views, publicize its aims, and
magnify its exposure to the public," and thus would likely continue to
32
speak to reporters. While the Court demanded quantification to prove
that the acknowledged chilling effect was substantial, it offered no
quantified measure for its own conclusions that most confidential sources
would continue to provide information to reporters who broke that
confidentiality in the grand jury room.
29. Id. at 693-94.
30. Id. at 693.
31. Id. The dissenters, on the other hand, gave more weight to the possible
chilling effect on news-gathering. See, e.g., id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("this
decision [will] impair performance of the press' constitutionally protected
functions."). They developed a more coherent test which would require the
government to show a "compelling and overriding" interest and "'convincingly'
demonstrate that the investigation is 'substantially related' to the information
sought." Id. at 739-40 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Without such a test, the dissenting
justices argued, the broad scope of a grand jury's powers will allow the government
to infringe upon a great deal of otherwise protected information bearing little or no
relevance to the case at hand. Id. at 744 (Stewart, J., dissenting). While in this case
they believed that the government had not met its burden, they recognized that there
could be times where it would be necessary to curtail the protections afforded to the
press. Id. at 747 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissenters also took exception to the
majority's high bar for proving the chilling effect. While acknowledging that not
every relationship between a reporter and his source requires confidentiality, they
claimed that the Court had:
never before demanded the that First Amendment rights rest on
elaborate empirical studies demonstrating beyond any
conceivable doubt that deterrent effects exist; we have never
before required proof of the exact number of people potentially
affected by governmental action, who would actually be
dissuaded from engaging in First Amendment activity.
Id. at 733 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 694-95.
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While the Court ultimately denied any basis for a privilege, it did
appear to perform some sort of balancing test, suggesting there might be
some higher level of protection afforded to reporters than ordinary
citizens. For example, the Court stated that it could not "accept the
argument that the public interest in possible future news about crime
from undisclosed, unverified sources must take precedence over the
governmental interest in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported
to the press by informants and in thus deterring the commission of such
crimes in the future. 33 Thus, the Court appeared to say that the public
interest in law enforcement outweighed the news value of stories it
seemed to believe were relatively unimportant to the public agenda.
Furthermore, much of the Court's justification relied on its conclusion
that any negative impact on reporting would be insubstantial.34
Presumably, then, if the reporters could have met the Court's demanding
bar for proving a substantial chilling effect, the Court might have
recognized First Amendment protection for maintaining confidentiality.
The Court also believed that even if a shield privilege were
recognized, its usefulness would be minor unless such a privilege was
absolute. 35 If a privilege were adopted that required the government to
establish a compelling interest in order to avoid a motion to quash the
subpoena, the Court stressed, the reporter would be left with the same
chilling effect because there would be uncertainty as to when the
36privilege would be recognized. Furthermore, the Court stated that
application of a qualified privilege for reporters would be logistically
difficult to apply.37 The Court noted that the Department of Justice had
issued guidelines for subpoenaing testimony from journalists, suggesting
33. Id. at 695.
34. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
35. Id. at 702.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 703-06. The Court found that a qualified privilege would be difficult
to apply for several reasons. First, it would require the Court to define "those
categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege." Id. at 704. Second, the
Courts would have to administer a lengthy inquiry to determine whether the
privilege applies in each individual case. Id. at 705. Finally, such an inquiry would
require the Courts to infringe on "value judgment[s]" that should best be left to the
legislature. Id. at 706 (alteration added).
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that the executive branch would be in the best position to police itself on
38issues of infringement upon press freedoms.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell wrote to "emphasize"
the "limited nature of the Court's holding., 39 He understood the majority
to have recognized that journalists do have constitutional protections
even in the grand jury context.40 He noted that a balance must be struck
"between the freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to
give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct, ' 41 and that each
instance should be judged on a case-by-case basis as the courts
42traditionally had done. In cases "where legitimate First Amendment
interests require protection," reporters may still seek protection through
the courts.43 Thus, Justice Powell, who joined the majority, explicitly
recognized the balancing of interests that the Court performed in
Branzburg, and stated that future cases should involve the same case-by-
case examination of the facts and competing interests.
The federal courts have followed Branzburg when dealing with
First Amendment protections for confidential sources. However, the
circuits vary in their interpretations of the holding. In Zerilli v. Smith,
44
the D.C. Circuit held that although there is no absolute privilege under
Branzburg, there is First Amendment protection for maintaining
confidentiality in the civil law context.45 Similarly, the Third Circuit has
recognized First Amendment protection in the context of a criminal trial
46as opposed to a grand jury proceeding: in United States v. Criden, the
court cited Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Branzburg to
demonstrate the necessity of balancing First Amendment press
38. Id. at 706-707.
39. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
40. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
42. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
43. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
44. 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
45. Id. at 707. Here the court seemed to recognize that the governmental
interest in criminal indictment through the grand jury carries greater weight than the
private interests competing against First Amendment interests in the civil context.
Id. at 711 (stating that the Branzburg holding was limited to the criminal law
context).
46. 633 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1980).
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protections against the need for effective law enforcement. 47 Drawing
upon this balancing, the court ruled:
[A] journalist does in fact possess a privilege that is
deeply rooted in the First Amendment. When no
countervailing constitutional concerns are at stake,
it can be said that the privilege is absolute; when
constitutional precepts collide, the absolute gives
way to the qualified and a balancing process comes
into play to determine its limits.
48
Several other courts have also recognized that Branzburg stands•4 9
for the importance of balancing competing interests. In applying
Branzburg, most federal circuits have followed its holding strictly in the
context of grand jury subpoenas, finding that there is no privilege under
the First Amendment. 5° However, it seems possible based on the rule in
47. Id. at 355.
48. Id. at 356 (alteration added). Arguably, the interests in a criminal trial are
different than in a grand jury proceeding because of the secrecy of the grand jury.
As the Branzburg Court saw it, "[o]nly where news sources themselves are
implicated in crime or possess information relevant to the grand jury's task need
they or the reporter be concerned about grand jury subpoenas." Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972) (alteration added). This assertion must rely on the premise
that because grand jury proceedings are secret, the source's anonymity to the public
is not at risk unless he is indicted or called upon to testify in a later criminal
proceeding.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 11 F. Supp. 2d 656, 662 (D. Md.
1998) (noting that Branzburg "recognized that the First Amendment ... protects
news gathering activities," but that in "examin[ing] both the expected burden on
news gathering and the important role of the grand jury in effective law enforcement,
[the Court] concluded that the public's interest in law enforcement was sufficient to
override the burden imposed") (alterations added) (citations omitted). Cf Zerilli,
656 F.2d at 711 (recognizing First Amendment protection in civil cases, and finding
Branzburg not controlling "where the public interest in effective criminal law
enforcement is absent," thereby suggesting that the public interest in criminal
prosecution carries more weight on the scales than private interests in civil cases).
50. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1987)
(holding there is no First Amendment privilege in the grand jury context because
Branzburg rejected the existence of such a privilege); Lewis v. United States, 517
F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding that Branzburg only recognized First
Amendment protections in the grand jury context "where a grand jury investigation




Criden that the Third Circuit would recognize a qualified First
Amendment privilege in the grand jury context as well.5 1 The Criden
court's decision reflects an expansive reading of Branzburg, using
Justice Powell's concurrence to temper what might otherwise be
52interpreted as a harsh result. Decisions like that in Criden have
bolstered the media's claims that Branzburg should not be read so
harshly against journalists in similar situations. As an attorney for the
New York Times in Branzburg noted, "there is no greater gloom in the
media world than in 1972 when the Branzburg case came out .... That
was the death knell, and there was no way the press could get out of that.
But like Houdini, it did.",53  Similarly, one journalism professor
commented that there was "this truce for a generation since Branzburg
[where] [n]obody really pushed it," although he felt the truce ended with
the decision in Miller.
54
II. THE JUDITH MILLER CASES
Although many reporters have been subpoenaed to reveal their
news sources, Judith Miller has become a recent symbol of this
phenomenon. Her imprisonment for refusing to testify in regards to her
confidential sources in the grand jury investigation of the Valerie Plame
leak captured headlines and renewed the debate over the level of First
Amendment protection reporters enjoy regarding the confidentiality of
their sources 5  Miller's involvement in a news story about Islamic
charities with suspected terrorist ties garnered less attention but poses
51. The point may be moot since the Third Circuit appears to recognize a
federal common law privilege that is applicable in the grand jury context. See In re
Grand Jury Subpoena of Williams, 766 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Pa. 1991), aft'd963 F.2d
567 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (affirmed without discussion of the merits).
52. The Criden court relied on Justice Powell's description of the "tension"
between the Press Clause against the need for effective criminal justice as requiring
a balancing between competing constitutional principles. Criden, 633 F.2d at 355.
53. Statements by James Goodale, quoted in Rachel Smolkin, Uncharted
Territory, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Oct.-Nov. 2005, available at http://www.ajr.org/
Article.asp?id=3966 (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
54. Statements by Mark Feldstein, quoted in Adam Liptak, After Libby Trial,
New Era for Government and Press, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2007, at A 18 (alterations
added).
55. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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similar issues and offers a basis for requiring responsible exercise of a
free press in order for the press to receive heightened First Amendment
protection. Taken together, the two cases highlight the important role of
the media in fostering democratic participation and the reciprocal
responsibilities they must fulfill in order to enjoy the protections offered
by the First Amendment. However, these goals are not served by the
approach typically taken by courts in such cases. Understanding the
facts of these two cases is key to evaluating how the courts should
approach the level of protection offered to reporters by the First
Amendment.
A. The Valerie Plame Leak Investigation
In his 2003 State of the Union address, President George W.
Bush discussed the security threats posed to the United States by Iraq:
The International Atomic Energy Agency
confirmed in the 1990s that Saddam Hussein had
an advanced nuclear weapons development
program, had a design for a nuclear weapon and
was working on five different methods of enriching
uranium for a bomb. The British government has
learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa.56
It was the last sentence that led former Ambassador Joseph
Wilson to write an op-ed piece for the New York Times on July 6, 2003,
in which he said that he had visited Niger to investigate these claims on
behalf of the CIA.57 He further indicated that he had let the CIA and the
State Department know that the claims were highly doubtful, and he
suggested that the administration purposely ignored his findings in the
build-up to war.58 A little over a week later, reporter Robert Novak
published a column in the Chicago Sun-Times in which he said that he
had learned from "two senior administration officials" that Wilson's wife
56. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/0 1/20030128-19.html.
57. Joseph C. Wilson, Op.-Ed., What I Didn't Find in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Jul.




worked at the CIA and secured the assignment for her husband.59 He
also identified Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame, by name.
60
Further media reports detailing administration officials'
discussions with reporters concerning Wilson's wife and her career at the
CIA surfaced. The Department of Justice soon began investigating the
6 1 62leaks as possibly criminal under 50 U.S.C. § 421. In October 2003,
Richard Armitage, then Deputy Secretary of State, told investigators that
he was Novak's source.63 In December 2003, Attorney General John
Ashcroft recused himself and appointed Patrick Fitzgerald as Special
Counsel to oversee the investigation.6 Fitzgerald then convened a grand
65jury. As part of its investigation, the grand jury issued subpoenas to
Matthew Cooper of Time magazine and Judith Miller of the New York
Times in 2004.66 The subpoenas sought both testimony and documents
that might help the government identify sources who identified Plame to
the reporters. 67 Both reporters refused to comply with the subpoenas and
sought to have them quashed on the theory that journalists' ability to
59. Robert Novak, Op.-Ed., Even After a Belated Admission of Error Last
Week, Finger Pointing Continued, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jul. 14, 2003, at 31.
60. Id. Novak later revealed that his primary source did not reveal Plame's
name, but that he learned it by looking up Wilson's entry in Who's Who in America.
He also confirmed the source's information with a second administration official,
Karl Rove, and the CIA. Robert Novak, Op.-Ed., My Role in the Plame Leak Probe,
CHI. SN-TIMES, Jul. 12, 2006, at 14.
61. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1143 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
62. Among other things, the statute makes it criminal for an official with
access to classified information to reveal the identity of covert agent "knowing that
the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is
taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's intelligence relationship
to the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 421 (1994).
63. Michael Isikoff, The Man Who Said Too Much, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 4, 2006,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14533384/site/newsweek.
64. Tony Locy, Attorney general recuses himself from CIA probe, USA
TODAY, Dec. 31, 2003, at 10A.
65. Id.
66. Miller, 438 F.3d at 1144.
67. Id. Cooper did not originally report the information regarding Plame that
he learned from his sources. After Novak's column, he published an article on
Time.com that referenced a conversation similar to the one that Novak referenced.
Id. at 1143. Miller never published anything based on what her source revealed to
her. Id. at 1182 (Tatel, J., concurring).
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gather news (and thus the operation of a free press itself) is hampered by
the resulting chilling effect on the use of confidential sources.68
Judith Miller and Matthew Cooper relied on both the First
Amendment and the federal common law in their appeal before the D.C.
Circuit. First, they argued that the First Amendment allows journalists to
conceal confidential sources-a privilege that, according to Miller and
69Cooper, extends to the arena of grand jury subpoenas. Second, they
asserted that there is a federal common law privilege, independent of any
First Amendment protections, which allows a journalist to conceal
confidential sources.7 ° In In Re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, the
D.C. Circuit unanimously held that the First Amendment provides no
protection for journalists maintaining the confidentiality of their sources
when subpoenaed by a grand jury.7' The court stated that the Supreme
Court had settled this question in Branzburg.72 Finding no factual
differences between the cases at bar and Branzburg,73 the circuit court
68. Id. at 1144.
69. Id. In their reply brief to the D.C. Circuit, the reporters took issue with the
Special Counsel's interpretation of Justice Powell's Branzburg concurrence as
limiting protection to those instances where grand jury investigations are conducted
in bad faith. Arguing that bad faith grand jury investigations do not implicate First
Amendment rights (which Justice Powell recognized) because any citizen may seek
recourse from a bad faith subpoena, the reporters instead urged the court to follow
the balancing test identified in Justice Powell's concurrence. Reply Brief of
Appellants Judith. Miller, Matthew Cooper and Time Inc. at 4, In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 04-3138, 04-3139,
04-3140), 2004 WL 4957263.
70. Miller, 438 F.3d at 1145. Miller and Cooper also argued that their due
process rights were violated because they were not allowed access to much of the
evidence the government used to overcome any asserted privilege. Id. They also
claimed that the Special Counsel's alleged failure to comply with the Justice
Department's guidelines for issuing subpoenas to journalists provided independent
grounds for reversal. Id. The court rejected both arguments, holding that the use of
in camera and ex parte proceedings did not violate the due process rights of the
reporters because of the importance of grand jury secrecy, and that the Department
of Justice guidelines regarding subpoenas issued to reporters created no enforceable
right. Id. at 1150-52.
71. Id. at 1145.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1146. For an argument that there were important differences
between Branzburg and these cases, see David L. Westin, Op.-Ed., Just About the
Weakest Case, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2005, at A10 (arguing that the fact that the
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did not engage in any sort of balancing as the Supreme Court appeared to
do in Branzburg.14 The court was split on whether the federal common
law provided any protection for a reporter's confidential sources, but all
judges agreed that if such a privilege existed, it would be overcome by
the national security concerns at issue in the case.75 After this decision,
Cooper cooperated with the grand jury76 while Miller was held in
contempt of court and jailed until she, too, finally agreed to testify.77
underlying crime in Miller was committed by the government, which then sought to
coerce testimony from the journalists, changed the dynamics significantly). In
essence, Westin argues that the government used the press to police itself, which
Justice Powell said the Court did not condone when it made its decision in
Branzburg. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (noting that the Court did not hold "that state and federal authorities are
free to 'annex' the news media as 'an investigative arm of the government"'
(quoting id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting))).
74. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. In his concurring opinion,
Judge Tatel did attempt to balance the government's interest in compelling
disclosure against the reporters' interest in maintaining confidentiality, finding that
the government's interests trumped the public interest in maintaining confidentiality.
Miller, 438 F.3d at 1178 (Tatel, J., concurring). Judge Tatel noted that the leaks in
question were "a serious matter." Id. He indicated that "Plame evidently traveled
overseas on clandestine missions beginning nearly two decades ago" and concluded
that her covert activities as well as that of her associates may have been
compromised by the leak. Id. at 1178-79. He later indicated that "[w]hile another
case might require more specific evidence that a leak harmed national security," the
fact that the CIA seemed to have strongly implied to Novak that Plame was covert at
some point in time was sufficient. Id. at 1182 (alteration added).
75. Miller, 438 F.3d at 1150. Judge Sentelle wrote the majority opinion for the
court. Each of the three judges also wrote separate concurring opinions on the issue
of whether there was a federal common law privilege that allowed reporters to
maintain confidentiality of their sources in the grand jury context, with Judge
Sentelle arguing that there is no federal common law privilege, id. at 1154 (Sentelle,
J., concurring), Judge Henderson arguing that if a common law privilege existed it
would be overcome on these facts, id. at 1159 (Henderson, J., concurring), and Judge
Tatel arguing that there is a common law privilege, but it is overcome on these facts.
Id. at 1164 (Tatel, J., concurring).
76. Matthew Cooper, What I Told the Grand Jury, TIME, Jul. 25, 2005, at 38,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1083899,00.html.
77. Miller, supra note 1. Miller was steadfast in her refusal until two things
happened. First, her source, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, released her from her
promise of confidentiality. Second, Special Counsel Fitzgerald agreed to limit the
inquiry to information relevant to conversations with Libby and to refrain from
questions regarding other sources of information. Id.
B. Reporters Alert Islamic Charities of Government Raids
Judith Miller and Special Counsel Fitzgerald were also at odds in
another leak investigation, this one stemming from two stories that
appeared in the New York Times in December 2001. Miller and Philip
Shenon, another Times reporter, each received information from
confidential government sources that a different Islamic charity was
suspected of funding terrorist organizations and was about to be searched
by federal agents and have its assets frozen. 8 Each reporter, the day
before the government raid, called the charity about which he or she had
been given information and asked for comment on the impending
government action.79 Furthermore, Miller's first article about the search
of the charity was published in the late edition the day before the raid.
s°
Effectively, the reporters alerted the charities to the action, giving them
opportunity to prepare for the search and perhaps hide evidence before
their assets were frozen. In fact, when federal agents arrived at one of
the charities in question, they were greeted by the charity's lawyer."
Upon discovering that the reporters had tipped the government's
hand to the charities, the government began an inquiry into the identities
of the reporters' sources. In August 2002, Special Counsel Fitzgerald
initiated communications with the Times to seek its voluntary
cooperation. Ultimately, in 2004, the Justice Department informed the
Times that it would subpoena the paper's telephone records from its
telephone company in an attempt to locate the reporters' sources.82
Believing that such a subpoena would violate its First Amendment
protections, the Times filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that such
a subpoena could not be enforced. 83 The Times argued first that the
Constitution and federal common law allowed the reporters to protect the
confidentiality of their sources and also that the subpoena was overbroad
in that it gave the government access to all sources reached by telephone
during the period in question, not just those who were relevant to the
78. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2006).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 164 n.2.
82. Id. at 164.
83. Id at 165.
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 5448
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES
84case at hand. The district court granted the Times' motion for summary
judgment, finding that the confidentiality of the reporters' sources was
85protected by both federal common law and the First Amendment. The
government appealed the decision to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.
In New York Times v. Gonzales, the Second Circuit reversed the
86
district court's decision. Like the D.C. Circuit, the Second Circuit did
not recognize any First Amendment or federal common-law privilege
that would be applicable to the facts of the case at bar.87 The court ruled
that without an applicable privilege, the government was free to
subpoena the Times' telephone records.88  Any concerns that the
subpoena was too broad-in that it allowed the government access to
information unrelated to the case---could be corrected through
cooperation by the Times and its reporters in redacting irrelevant
89information.
In the New York Times decision, the court seemed to give some
weight to the value provided by a responsible media, although it never
specifically articulated this philosophy. The court's decision hinged in
great part on the fact that "the reporters were not passive collectors of
information whose evidence is a convenient means for the government to
identify an official prone to indiscretion," 90 but rather were active
84. Id. at 164-65.
85. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F.Supp.2d 457, 484-508 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
86. NY Times, 459 F.3d at 174.
87. Id. at 169.
88. Id. at 174.
89. Id. The Times argued that redaction was not a feasible alternative but
merely a means by which the newspaper could in essence be compelled to point the
government toward the sources it was looking for. The court remained unmoved by
this argument, stating that:
[T]he government, having uruccessfully sought the Times'
cooperation, cannot be charged by the Times with having
issued an unnecessarily overbroad subpoena. By the same
token, the government, if offered cooperation that
eliminates the need for the examination of the Times'
phone records in gross, cannot resist the narrowing of the
information to be produced.
Id. at 171 (alteration added).
90. Id. at 170.
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participants in alerting the charities to the impending government
action. 91 The court apparently did not require the government to provide
,,392detailed evidence to overcome the asserted privilege because the
reporters acted as "conduit[s] to alert the targets of an asset freeze and/or
searches. 93
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Sack took issue with the court's
failure to acknowledge a source privilege and define its contours. More
importantly, he felt that in no way had the government taken the
appropriate steps to overcome the privilege asserted. Judge Sack argued
that cases involving government leaks are necessarily different than other
cases involving confidential sources because leak cases implicate the
media's role in informing the electorate about the conduct of its
government.94 In these cases the courts should balance the governmental
interest in compelled disclosure against the public interest in
'"newsgathering and maintaining a free flow of information."' 95 He was
also adamant that courts should not take the government's word that it
had exhausted all alternative methods of identifying the sources of the
leaks or that it had important interests in identifying the sources of the
91. Id.
92. The Court stated:
[O]ur holding is limited to the facts before us, namely the
disclosures of upcoming asset freezes/searches and
informing the targets of them .... [I]n order to show a
need for the phone records, the government asserts by way
of affidavit that it has "reasonably exhausted alternative
investigative means" and declines to give further details of
the investigation on the ground of preserving grand jury
secrecy. While we believe that ... is sufficient on the facts
of this case, we in no way suggest that such a showing
would be adequate in a case involving less compelling
facts.
Id. at 171 (alterations added).
93. Id. at 173. The court also noted that the reporters' actions "probably
caused" the investigation into the leaks in the first place. Id. at 170.
94. Id. at 185 (Sack, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 186 (Sack, J., dissenting) (quoting the proposed Free Flow of
Information Act, S. 2831, 109th Cong., § 4(b)(4) (2006)). Judge Sack noted the
basic equivalence between his test and that advocated by Judge Tatel in the Miller
case. Id. See supra note 74.
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leaks. 96 For the privilege to have effect, the executive branch must not
be free to determine when the privilege applies and when it does not.
Rather, Justice Sack stressed, the courts must be responsible for
protecting First Amendment interests and determining evidentiary
standards.97 Because the government did not make the showings
necessary to overcome the privilege as he identified it, Judge Sack would
not have allowed enforcement of the subpoena sought by the government
98in this case.
Both Miller and New York Times rely on excessively narrow
interpretations of the Supreme Court's holding in Branzburg, failing to
recognize the important differences that arise when the government is
seeking to discourage the use of confidential sources within its own
ranks. Neither holding recognizes any level of First Amendment
protection for maintaining the confidentiality of reporters' sources. The
danger of such an approach is that it fails to account for factual
differences in cases that might affect the balancing that Justice Powell,
and possibly the Court as a whole, endorsed in Branzburg. By their
rejection of reporters' claims in the grand jury contexts, the two appellate
courts give no weight to the public interests served by maintaining
confidentiality, even in cases where this value may exceed the
government's interests in exposing confidential sources. A closer
critique of the two decisions reveals why an alternative approach would
better protect the public interest at stake in cases involving government
leaks.
III. A BETTER APPROACH
A. Problems with the Miller and New York Times Decisions
The Miller and New York Times decisions are flawed in that they
fail to recognize any concrete protections afforded by the Press Clause as
well as the danger that the government's actions may adversely impact
the democratic process. An analysis that takes these factors into account
would not necessarily alter the outcome of these two cases, but it would
96. Id. at 188-89 (Sack, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 177 (Sack, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 189 (Sack, J., dissenting).
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create a discernible standard that would promote public discourse and
civic participation while offering the media a better understanding of
their rights and responsibilities.
The courts' flawed interpretations of Branzburg that neglect a
balancing of competing interests strip the media of any real protections,
at least in the context of grand jury subpoenas. This approach fails to
account for important factual differences between the Judith Miller cases
and Branzburg. Chief among these differences is the fact that in both
Miller and New York Times, the government was policing its own
employees by compelling the reporters to identify their sources. In
Branzburg, on the other hand, the reporters' stories centered on drug-
related crimes and illegal activities carried out by private parties. The
public interest in government activities and the workings of American
intelligence agencies is inevitably greater than that in "possible future
news about crime."'9 9 The Branzburg court noted that there was:
little ... [to] indicat[e] that informants whose interest in
avoiding exposure is that it may threaten job security,
personal safety, or peace of mind would in fact be in a
worse position, or would think they would be, if they
risked placing their trust in public officials as well as
reporters. 00
This conclusion is less tenable in the instant cases where the sources'
employer-the federal government-is the party conducting the grand
jury investigation. In cases involving government sources, a leak will
often reflect a determination by its source that he cannot place his trust in
public officials and thus the only avenue for addressing the perceived
problem is through the news media.
Furthermore, the Branzburg Court noted that there were
instances where grand jury subpoenas were not justifiable-such as
where the government's purpose in compelling disclosure was "to,101
disrupt a reporter's relationship with his news sources" -and that the
government was not free to commandeer the media as its investigative
arm. 0 2  Such dangers are inherent in a leak investigation: the
99. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 695 (1972).
100. Id. (emphasis added) (alterations added).
101. Id. at 707-08.
102. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
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government's purpose here is always at least in part to prevent such
communications in the future.' 0 3 In internal investigations, the reporter is
often identified as essential to the government's internal policing
procedures. 0 4  Having recognized these dangers, the courts should
engage in more delicate balancing in cases where this danger is high to
account for differing fact patterns, rather than applying Branzburg as a
strict, bright-line rule.
The Miller and New York Times decisions also fail to give any
real consideration to the chilling effects of compelled disclosure, which
may even be greater in the context of these cases than in Branzburg. The
chilling effect seems especially likely in the context of government leaks.
Where the media serves its role of fostering democratic participation, the
nature of their relationship with the government is bound to be tense.
10 5
It is not surprising then that historically that relationship has often been
103. Compare this to the context of the consolidated Branzburg cases where
the government arguably had an interest in encouraging the relationship, as the news
reports themselves may have helped the government identify certain problem areas
on which it should have focused its crime prevention efforts.
104. As Judge Sack noted in his N. Y. Times dissent:
In "leak" investigations, unlike in the typical situations
with which courts have dealt over the years, the reporter is
more than a third-party repository of information. He or
she is likely an "eyewitness" to the crime, alleged crime,
potential crime, or asserted impropriety. Once the
prosecution has completed an internal investigation of
some sort, therefore, it may be in a position to overcome
the classic reporter's privilege because it may well be able
to make "a clear and specific showing that the information
[i.e., the identity of the source] is: highly material and
relevant, necessary or critical to the maintenance of the
claim [that someone known or unknown 'leaked' the
information to a reporter], and not obtainable from other
available sources."
N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 185 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sack, J., dissenting)
(alterations added) (citing In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 680 F. 2d 5, 7-
8 (1982)).
105. See, e.g., id. at 184 (Sack, J., dissenting) ("The result [of the press' role
in the democratic process as created by the First Amendment] is a healthy
adversarial tension between the government ... and the press." (alteration added)).
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adversarial. 0 6  That natural tension between the media and the
government is only amplified by the nature of the modem mass media
and may explain the courts' traditional hesitancy to give much weight to
the news media's need for substantive protection under the First
Amendment. The modem twenty-four-hour news cycle has changed the
nature of news coverage. 1°7 In a 2001 report on PBS's The News Hour
with Jim Leher, CBS White House correspondent Bill Plante noted that
the mass media puts people in the government "on edge."'10 8 Likewise,
U.S. News & World Report White House correspondent Kenneth Walsh
stated that reporters now feel pressure to focus on controversy because
the demands of the mass media encourage edgy stories; controversial
stories gamer more attention and are thus taken more seriously inside the
109newsroom.
The potential chilling effect may be even greater in the context
of the current Bush administration, which is seen by many as one of the
most tight-lipped administrations in history.110 Former White House
Press Secretary Ari Fleischer blamed much of the tension between the
106. Even Thomas Jefferson, a champion of the importance of a free press to
the democratic process, became dismayed by press coverage of his presidency:
"Nothing can now be believed which is seen in a newspaper. Truth itself becomes
suspicious by being put into that polluted vehicle." CULLEN, supra note 9, at 38.
107. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast Apr. 25,
2001), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-juneO1/president_4-
25.html (examining the media coverage of the transition in the first 100 days of
George W. Bush's presidency).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Jay Rosen, Bush to Press: "You 're Assuming That You Represent the
Public. I Don't Accept That," PressThink, available at http://joumalism.nyu.edu/
pubzone/weblogs/pressthink/2004/04/25/bushmuscle.html (noting that President
Bush had held eleven news conferences at a certain point in his presidency where the
first President Bush had held seventy-one and President Clinton had held thirty-
eight). As one reporter has commented on this phenomenon:
And when you ask the Bush people to explain that attitude,
what they say is: We don't accept that you have a check
and balance function. We think that you are in the game of
"Gotcha." Oh, you're interested in headlines, and you're
interested in conflict. You're not interested in having a
serious discussion.., and exploring things.
administration and the press on the nature of media coverage in
general. 1  In Fleischer's view the Washington press corps has a
tendency to treat politics like sports, focusing mainly on naming the
winners and losers.' 12  There has also been some suggestion among
commentators that President Bush's avoidance of the media is due in
large part to the way he feels the media treated his father's presidency.113
Given the administration's inherent hesitance to talk to members of the
news media, 14 the potential chilling effect of forcing reporters to reveal
confidential discussions with administration officials seems all the more
real.
When journalists exercise their role in the democratic process
responsibly, their need to protect confidential sources will often play an
important part in enabling that duty. A government source who is
unwilling to speak on the record for fear of reprisal, but who nonetheless
feels that the public should have access to certain information, will now
likely think twice before speaking to reporters about controversial
subjects." 5 Armed with the knowledge that the government may force
reporters to reveal their identities, sources may stop giving reporters such
information, cutting off the flow of information not just to the reporters,
but more importantly, to the public.
111. The News Hour, supra note 107.
112. Id. Perhaps surprisingly, Fleischer did not feel the media's coverage of
the Bush administration was any harsher than coverage of prior administrations.
Pointing towards the coverage of President Clinton, Fleischer remarked that "[t]he
Washington press corps couldn't let the poor man go. The American people already
had." Id. (alteration added). He characterized the Clinton coverage as "overkill."
Id.
113. Id. It seems likely that part of his avoidance of the media stems from a
desire to avoid the perceived "gotcha" mentality of the press, see supra note 110,
and intense media coverage of the inevitable gaffes. For example, recall the media
coverage of Vice President Dan Quayle's infamous "potato" mistake. If there is any
doubt as to how much media attention the incident garnered, an online search for
"Dan Quayle" on Yahoo brings up "Dan Quayle potato" as a related recommended
search.
114. Rosen, supra note 110 (arguing that the Bush administration believes
there is no role for the current news media in the system of checks and balances
because of the administration's perception that the press has become "an interest
group" that doesn't "channel[] the public and its questions") (alteration added).
115. And controversial subjects are arguably the ones to which the public
needs greater access in order to make informed decisions come election time.
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In late 2005, an American Journalism Review article found
anecdotal evidence of a chilling effect resulting from the Plame leak
investigation." 6 The executive director of the Project on Government
Oversight, who routinely helps reporters connect with government
sources on stories that have important public ramifications, told Time
magazine that she would "not be able to give [the magazine's reporters]
access to people whose identity needs to be protected" because of the
magazine's cooperation with federal investigators in the Plame
investigation.' 17 The article also provided accounts of various reporters
who said the scandal had affected their relationships with confidential118
sources. While many of those interviewed for the AJR article did not
feel the chilling effects, 119 reporter Stuart Taylor, Jr. noted that the real
danger in the chilling effect is in a relatively small number of cases
where the sources are "highly sensitive."120  Presumably, where the
sources are the most sensitive, the information will also be of the greatest
value to the public debate. The difficulty with Branzburg's high bar is
that the Court in essence asked reporters to prove a negative. Even if the
chilling effect created is substantial, it is difficult for a reporter to prove
that he is losing sources of information because the sources may not
indicate to the reporter that they are withholding information. As one
journalist has noted in response to this phenomenon, "'[y]ou don't know- ,,121
what you don't know. However, as even the majority in Branzburg
116. See Smolkin, supra note 53.
117. Id. (alteration added)
118. Id. at 32-35. The New York Times noted that several of its "Washington
reporters have noted signs of longtime sources becoming more anxious and more
reluctant to speak freely on sensitive subjects." Id. The Los Angeles Times indicated
that some of its Washington sources have questioned whether the paper will truly
protect confidentiality. Id. at 34. Reporter Rebecca Carr noted that her longtime
FBI source expressed fear at being "outed" and told her that "agents are under great
pressure to give up other agents in various leak investigations under way. 'If you get
outed, you are dead' on the job, he said. 'People are scared."' Id. at 35.
119. In fact, many of the reporters felt that the case could have a positive
impact on journalism by encouraging reporters to act more responsibly in their use
of confidential sources by determining if the promise of confidentiality is warranted
under the circumstances and whether the issue is important enough that the reporter
would risk jail time to protect such a promise. Id. at 32-36.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 34 (alteration added) (quoting Knight Ridder Washington Editor
Clark Hoyt).
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indicated, there is no doubt that the chilling effect exists."' And it is
situations where government sources are at issue that its effects will most
damage the role of the news media in fostering an educated electorate.
The failure of the courts to recognize that public speech will be
chilled by the forced disclosure of sources who have spoken on the
condition of anonymity also endangers the public interest in a free flow
of information. None of the judges on the Miller court seemed to give
any weight to the news value of the information provided by the
confidential sources. Judge Tatel brushed aside the news value of the
leak by saying it only reflected on Wilson's credibility."' What he failed
to address was the broader context in which both Wilson's statements
and the administration's leaks were being made. The country had just
entered a controversial war in Iraq. Wilson was leveling charges that the
administration took the country into war on false pretenses. It was the
year before a national election that would in large part be defined by the
war in Iraq and possible intelligence failures.
The Supreme Court has stated that juries are entitled to hear
details of a case that help to tell "a colorful story with descriptive
richness," theorizing that "[e]vidence . ..has force beyond any linear
scheme of reasoning, and as its pieces come together a narrative gains
momentum, with power not only to support conclusions but to sustain the
willingness of jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they may be,
necessary to reach an honest verdict."' 24  Narrative power is also
important in the news setting, and details should be available to the
electorate so it can make an informed decision in holding its government
accountable through the ballot. When courts require journalists to reveal
confidential sources, they will undoubtedly chill to some degree the
public's access to such narratives. Thus, it was appropriate to balance
the public interest in the narrative of issues concerning national security
against the potential harm posed to national security by the disclosure of
122. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972).
123. The implication being that nepotism or something similar played a part in
Wilson's selection; thus, he was not the best suited candidate for such a mission, and
his findings may not be as reliable. Judge Tatel found that the leak had but marginal
news value, serving only to reflect on Joseph Wilson's credibility. In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Tatel, J.,
concurring).
124. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997) (alteration added).
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such details, giving full weight to both sides. The courts in Miller and
New York Times failed to give significant attention to the value of either.
The problem with decisions that fail to give adequate attention to
the protections afforded the press by the First Amendment is that they
interfere with the efficient function of the democratic process. If the
courts continue to erode the news media's freedoms to report without
government interference, there is real danger that the government will
lose much of its accountability to the public. If, for instance, government
sources stop providing reporters with information they think the public
should know, there may be no other avenue for the public to access such
information.125  Here, the courts can protect the important role of the
press as a check on government power by affording it greater protections
and offering a standard by which it will apply such protections.
B. Developing a New Standard for First Amendment Press Protections
1. The Importance of Balancing
Courts often weigh speech interests against various
governmental interests in restricting speech or press. 126 However, free
press advocates believe that in applying this balancing test, courts often
fail to put the social values of speech on the scales; meaning, for
example, that an individual's speech or press rights, rather than the
interests of the general public in having the individual speak, are
weighed against society's security-usually resulting in First
Amendment interests giving way to governmental interests."' This
tendency is most common when national security concerns are the
competing interests. The Supreme Court places a high value on national
security such that it treats constitutional rights differently when national
125. For instance, consider the fallout from the Watergate scandal. Had Bob
Woodward and Carl Bernstein not promised and actively protected the anonymity of
their source, "Deep Throat," President Nixon may never have experienced the level
of public pressure that ultimately led to his resignation.
126. HARRY W. STONECIPHER, Safeguarding Speech and Press Guarantees:
Preferred Position Postulate Reexamined, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RECONSIDERED, supra note 7, at 93-94.
127. Id. at 94.
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128security is also at issue. When national security and constitutional
rights are in tension, the Court often applies a balancing test where the
constitutional right would otherwise normally prevail. 12  While this
balance is likely to look different in a post-September l1th world,
looking at the Court's prior decisions in this area highlights the basic
philosophy that will likely guide future decisions.
As early as the 1930s, the Court recognized that the First
Amendment affords different protections in the context of national
security concerns.130 While holding that a Minnesota statute allowing
publishers to be enjoined from printing "malicious, scandalous and
defamatory ' 131 publications was an unconstitutional prior restraint,' the
Court in Near v. Minnesota recognized that there are times when prior
restraints are constitutionally permissible."' These "exceptional
cases" 134 include times of war and maintaining civil order.135  Three
decades later, in Zemel v. Rusk,136 the Court held that the First
Amendment right to gather information does not prevent the government
from refusing to allow U.S. citizens to visit foreign countries that may
pose a national security threat.
137
The Court engaged in a lively debate on the interplay between
the First Amendment and national security concerns in the Pentagon
128. John S. Warner, National Security and the First Amendment, in 1:2 THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY 57, 57 (Ctr. For Law and Nat'l
Security, Univ. of Va. 1984).
129. Id.
130. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
131. Id. at 702.
132. Id. at 722-723.
133. Id. at 716.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
137. Id. at 16. While recognizing that a citizen might be better informed about
the government's national security determinations by visiting Cuba, the Court held
that the government's interests in maintaining national security outweighed the
citizen's right to a free flow of data. Furthermore, the Court characterized the
plaintiffs arguments as exceeding the scope of the First Amendment, noting that
"[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to
gather information." Id. at 17 (alteration added). While recognizing that there are
First Amendment rights to gather data, the Court noted that they were limited,
especially where there were more important considerations at issue. Id.
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Papers Case. 13 In 1971, the New York Times and the Washington Post
obtained classified documents regarding the Vietnam War. Once the
Nixon Administration discovered that the newspapers had classified
documents in their possession, it sought to enjoin them from publishing
the documents' contents. 139 In a hasty 6-3 decision, 140 the Court held that
the government's prior restraint was not constitutionally sustainable in
the case at bar,'14 but the various opinions issued reflected different
thoughts on the importance of national security interests. Two justices
argued that prior restraints on. the publication of news are never• ., 142
permissible. Three justices declared the prior restraints in the case at
bar unconstitutional but nonetheless believed that prior restraints could
be constitutional in certain situations. 143 The dissenting justices believed
138. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers Case), 403 U.S.
713 (1971) (per curiam).
139. Id. at 714.
140. The case had reached the Supreme Court in a matter of weeks and was
decided just four days after oral arguments.
141. The Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714.
142. Id. at 715 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black's concurring opinion,
joined by Justice Douglas, focused on the role of a free press in sustaining
democracy. Concerning the issue at hand, he argued:
The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets
of government and inform the people. Only a free and
unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in
government. And paramount among the responsibilities
of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the
government from deceiving the people and sending them
off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign
shot and shell. In my view, far from deserving
condemnation for their courageous reporting, the New
York Times, the Washington Post, and other newspapers
should be commended for serving the purpose that the
Founding Fathers saw so clearly. In revealing the
workings of government that led to the Vietnam war, the
newspapers nobly did precisely that which the Founders
hoped and trusted they would do.
Id. at 717.
143. Justice Brennan emphasized the heavy burden the government must carry
to allow a prior restraint, arguing:
But the First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior
judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise
that prior restraints could be constitutional and that the Court should
have taken more time to fully weigh the competing interests at stake.
144
The Court's decision in Branzburg a year later also demonstrated
the importance of balancing First Amendment rights against competing
interests.145 The Court did not deny the existence of First Amendment
protections for reporters; it merely found that those protections did not
or conjecture that untoward consequences may result.
Our cases, it is true, have indicated that there is a single,
extremely narrow class of cases in which the First
Amendment's ban on prior judicial restraint may be
overridden .... Thus, only governmental allegation and
proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and
immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to
imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can
support even the issuance of an interim restraining order.
In no event may mere conclusions be sufficient ....
Id. at 725-27 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart, who was joined in his
concurrence by Justice White, recognized an enormous executive power in matters
of national defense and foreign relations that gives rise to a duty to protect
government confidentiality. However, he believed that the government had not met
its burden of showing that disclosure would "surely result in direct, immediate and
irreparable damage to our Nation or its people." Id. at 727-30 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
144. Id. at 748 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice argued that a
temporary injunction could have remained in place until the Court had adequate time
to digest the facts and make an informed ruling that balanced the interests where "the
imperative of a free and unfettered press comes into collision with another
imperative, the effective functioning of a complex modem government and
specifically the effective exercise of certain constitutional powers of the Executive."
Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Furthermore, he pointed out, the fact that the New
York Times had the documents for several months before it began publishing them
undercut the press' argument that the public's right to know demanded a speedy
resolution. Id. at 750 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan argued that national security issues are political; thus, the role of
the judiciary must be extremely narrow. Id. at 757-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun noted that the First Amendment is no more important than Article
II of the Constitution, which gives the Executive Branch broad powers, and that the
Court should weigh "the broad right of the press to print and ... the very narrow
right of the Government to prevent." Id. at 761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Both
argued that the important issues at the heart of these cases required a more in-depth
analysis by the courts than could be given in the short time in which these cases were
processed.
145. See supra Part I.
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trump the asserted governmental interest in prosecuting crime through
the secrecy of the grand jury. In weighing the values at stake, the Court
held that "public interest in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes
reported to the press by informants and in thus deterring the commission
of such crimes in the future" outweighs "the public interest in possible
future news about crime.' '146 Furthermore, the Court felt it important that
the extent of the resulting chilling effect was not proven. 14' This
suggests that if a different case presented a more substantial burden on
newsgathering, the balance may be different. Just as the Court decided
in Zemel that national security interests outweighed the public interest in
free flow of information from countries posing national security threats,
the Branzburg court determined that the governmental interest in
prosecuting and preventing crime outweighed the free flow of
information about such crimes. Decided only a year after the Pentagon
Papers Case, it is unlikely that the Court intended to discount the
importance of the press to the democratic process that it lauded there. 148
Rather, the Branzburg decision reflects the Court's determination that the
public interest in news stories on crime is not sufficiently important to
outweigh the public interest in preventing the crime. The question is
whether the Court would consider a case like Miller differently, where
the public interest in receiving the news at issue is assuredly higher.
2. The Importance of Responsible Exercise of Journalism
Scholars have long debated what the Framers intended by the
language of the Press Clause. One theory that has developed is that the
media acts as a "fourth estate" whose duty it is to check the
government's power.149 Under this theory, "the press primarily serves as
an agent of the public to expose incidents of corruption in government
and to fulfill the public's 'right to know."",150 In essence, the press is
designed to serve as a watchdog or an institutional check on the
government. 151  Thus, the First Amendment creates a privileged
146. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 695 (1972).
147. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 142-43.
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industry.152 Other theorists take a more restrained view of the language.
Professor Leonard Levy, for example, argues that there was a common
understanding of press freedom at the time the First Amendment was
adopted: it encompassed freedom from previous restraint on publication,
but not freedom from punishment for irresponsible publication.
53
Whether we can identify the precise definition of the Press Clause the
Framers intended, it is clear that the spirit of protecting a free press was. • . 154
to foster democratic participation.
Early state court decisions interpreting press freedoms in
America' 55 demonstrated a common belief that the protection afforded to
the press by state constitutions was not absolute. 156 Many of the original
states adopted press clauses that were extremely expansive in the
protections they offered the press. 157 However, after the revolutionary
period, most states (including North Carolina and Virginia, which had
previously adopted two of the most expansive press clauses) adopted a
corresponding responsibility clause that allowed punishment for abuse of
that freedom. 15  Most state decisions in the early Nineteenth Century
152. Id. at 109.
153. Leonard W. Levy, On the Origins of the Free Press Clause, 32 UCLA L.
REv. 177, 183 (1984). Professor Levy's source for that understanding is
Blackstone's commentary on the role of the free press in a democratic society.
Highlighting the Framers' reliance on Blackstone's commentaries in so many other
areas and the wide acceptance of this view of press freedoms at the time, Professor
Levy argues that if the Framers had intended a different definition of press freedoms,
they would have detailed its scope. Id. at 202-03.
154. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
155. The federal courts did not address the meaning of a free press under the
First Amendment for more than 130 years after the Amendment was ratified.
Charlene J. Brown and Bill F. Chamberlin, Introduction to THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RECONSIDERED, supra note 7 at 1, 2. During this time, the states were left to
interpret the issue of a free press for themselves, establishing precedent that was later
relied upon by the Supreme Court in interpreting the First Amendment. Blanchard,
supra note 7, at 37-42.
156. See, e.g., Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319, 325 (Pa. 1788) (holding that
although the state constitution did not include language limiting the freedom of the
press "it is impossible that any good government should afford protection and
impunity" to publications "intended merely to delude and defame").
157. See American Bush v. South Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 1246-47 (2006)
(detailing the early development of American press protections offered in state
constitutions).
158. Id.
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reflected the belief that "' [1]iberty of the press consists of [only] the right
to publish with impunity, truth, with good motives, and for justifiable
ends, whether it respects government, magistracy, or individuals."' 59
This focus on responsibility carried over into judicial interpretations, as
early analysis focused on libelous material. Courts were loath to impose
prior restraints on publication but felt free to punish irresponsible
reporting after the fact. 160
In the early Twentieth Century, state courts began to focus on
responsible reporting in terms of the general welfare, weighing the public
interests served by news reporting against those served by restraining the161
press. They also began to recognize that certain interests, such as
protection of society against indecency and incitation to rebellion against
the state, took precedence over the right to publish without
interference.1 62 The opinions seem to be motivated by an underlying
belief that publication of indecent material or calling for overthrow of the
government was itself irresponsible.
In one case, the New York Court of Appeals held that the press
clauses of the state and federal constitutions did not "permit attempts to
destroy that freedom which the Constitutions have established," and thus
criminalization of advocating overthrow of the government was• . 163
constitutionally permissible. In so deciding, the court identified the
defendant as having an improper motive that denied him First
159. Id. at 20 (quoting People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 393-94 (N.Y.
1804) (alterations added)). It is important to recognize that the early courts did not
extend this protection against libel to the government. Id. at 20-21, 30-31. See, e.g.,
In re MacKnight, 27 P. 336, 339 (Mont. 1891) (stating that the purpose behind the
adoption of speech and press clauses was to protect speech or publication that
offended "governmental powers and agencies").
160. Blanchard, supra note 7, at 22-26.
161. Id. at 25-30.
162. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 94 So. 882 (Miss. 1923) (holding that the
criminalization of the sale of obscene materials did not violate the First Amendment
or the Mississippi Constitution's freedom of press guarantees); State v. Gibson, 174
N.W. 34, 36 (Iowa 1919) (holding that the Iowa Constitution's Press Clause did not
protect one "who uses his tongue for the purpose of annihilating a free
government").
163. People v. Gitlow, 136 N.E. 317, 319 (N.Y. 1922) (citing People v. Most,
64 N.E. 175, 178 (N.Y. 1902)) (alteration added).
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Amendment protections for the materials he published.' 64 Similarly, the
Kansas Supreme Court in 1895 upheld a law banning publications
"devoted largely to the publication of scandals, lechery, assignations,
intrigues between men and women, and immoral conduct of persons.",
65
In doing so, the court noted that such publications were "calculated to
taint the social atmosphere, and . . . tend[ed] especially to corrupt the
morals of the young, and lead them into vicious paths and immoral
acts."' 66 The court held that the Kansas Constitution's Press Clause did
not prevent the legislature from suppressing such publications. ,67
Common among the states, these views-that press protections
were limited by responsible exercise of the freedom-carried over into
federal decisions. In an early Twentieth Century case, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated:
It is a fundamental principle, long established, that
the freedom of speech. and of the press which is
secured by the Constitution, does not confer an
absolute right to speak or publish, without
responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an
unrestricted and unbridled license that gives
immunity for every possible use of language and
prevents the punishment of those who abuse this
freedom. 1
68
In 1946, the Court applied this responsibility requirement in a
case where the Florida courts had held a journalist and his newspaper in
contempt of court for criticizing sitting judges in relation to pending169
cases. The majority reversed the convictions, determining that, in the
circumstances of the case at bar, the First Amendment protected the
164. Id. The defendant was convicted for advocating anarchy by calling for a
violent mass strike that would overthrow the government. Id. The court stated that
"[t]he strikes advocated by the defendant were not for any labor purposes, or to bring
about the betterment of the workingman, but solely for political purposes to destroy
the state or to seize state power." Id. at 321 (alteration added).
165. In re Banks, 42 P. 693, 694 (Kan. 1895).
166. Id. (alteration added).
167. Id.
168. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
169. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 333 (1946).
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editorials. 7 0  However, the Court did note that the convictions could
have been sustained had the editorial presented a "clear and present
danger to the fair administration of justice. 17 1 In doing so, the Court
looked at the journalist's motives and the editorials' effect on criminal
proceedings,172 suggesting that the journalist had not acted irresponsibly,
but could have been liable if he had. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Frankfurter was more explicit about the responsibility inquiry:
A free press is vital to a democratic society because
its freedom gives it power. Power in a democracy
implies responsibility in its exercise . . . .Most
State constitutions expressly provide for liability
for abuse of the press's freedom. That there was
such legal liability was so taken for granted by the
framers of the First Amendment that it was not
spelled out. 173
This language of responsibility can be seen in various other press
174cases.
Viewing Branzburg in light of such precedent, the decision does
not foreclose an inquiry into reporters' responsibility. The importance of
the responsibility inquiry becomes apparent only when the reporters, by
acting irresponsibly, have failed their constitutional duty of fostering
democratic participation. Although the Branzburg Court did not address
the responsibility of the reporters, there is no indication that the Court
felt the reporters had acted irresponsibly. The Court instead based its
decision on the theory that the governmental interest in effective grand
jury proceedings outweighed the asserted First Amendment interest in
170. Id. at 349.
171. Id. at 348.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 355-56 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
174. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 51 (1971) ("In
an ideal world, the responsibility of the press would match the freedom and public
trust given in it."); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) ("A responsible
press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration ...."); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 732 (1931) ("'That [the
First A]mendment was intended to secure ... an absolute right to ... print whatever
he might please, without any responsibility ... is a supposition too wild to be
indulged . '..  (citation omitted) (alteration added)).
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newsgathering. 175 The Second Circuit's decision in New York Times,
however, suggests that the court was driven more by what it saw as the
irresponsible actions of Miller and Shenon than by a view that there are
no First Amendment protections for reporters. The court gave a good
deal of attention to the fact that the reporters had interfered in an ongoing
government investigation being conducted in the wake of the September
1 th terrorist attacks, referring to them as "conduit[s who worked] to
alert the targets of' a government investigation into possible terrorist
activities. 176 Further, the court also noted that by alerting the charities to
the impending raids, the reporters "probably caused" 177 an investigation
into the source of the leaks, suggesting that an investigation would not
have been necessary had Miller and Shenon not used the information in
such an irresponsible way.'78
This focus on responsible reporting takes on renewed importance
in the context of the twenty-four-hour news cycle, as the information
vital to creating an educated electorate is at risk of being lost amid the
many voices inherent in modem mass communication. 179  With
increasing corporate and commercial control of media outlets resulting in
limited access to the marketplace, the original conception of the press as
a marketplace of ideas is also at risk as the number of viewpoints is
limited. As Professors Ronald Collins and David Skover put it, in
modem society we "think less about the marketplace of ideas and more
175. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687 (1972). The Court also stated:
On the records now before us, we perceive no basis for
holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in
ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to
override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news
gathering that is said to result from insisting that reporters,
like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to
them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or
criminal trial.
Id. at 690-91.




179. RONALD K.L. COLLINS AND DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF
DISCOURSE 39-42; 47-65 (2d ed. 2005).
180. GARRY, supra note 7, at 62-63.
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about the marketing of items."' 181  They believe that focusing on
conceptions of the First Amendment speech protections under the
original marketplace of ideas theory invites trivialization of free
speech. 182 Given rampant commercialization in the modem media and
society's focus on pleasure, Collins and Skover argue that by extending
speech protection to all speech, the original intent behind the First
Amendment of promoting the democratic participation of an informed
electorate gets lost amid the clutter.'
83
Courts can allay their apparent fears to extend meaningful First
Amendment protections to the media by focusing their analysis on the
media's responsibility to foster democratic participation. Requiring
responsible exercise by journalists will encourage journalists to fulfill the
constitutional role the First Amendment created for them. In doing so,
the First Amendment will not offer the same level of protection to speech
that is less important to the democratic process. Divesting themselves of
this worry, the courts should then be free to weigh press freedoms
against competing government interests, giving adequate weight to the
value of a free press to the civic process.
The problem for journalists in adapting the practice of their trade
to this responsibility is that the courts have created no discernable
standard for responsible exercise. As Journalism Professor Margaret
Blanchard noted in response to two early decisions regarding press
responsibility, "[a]pparently, the decisions were based only on what the
judges intuitively believed was the place freedom of speech and freedom
of the press held in society." 84 This subjective approach is reminiscent
of Justice Stewart's famous observation that obscenity "may be
indefinable .... [b]ut I know it when I see it. '
It seems doubtful that responsible exercise of journalism is
186equally indefinable, and as such, a "you-know-it-when-you-see-it"
181. COLLINS AND SKOVER, supra note 179, at 70.
182. Id. at 36.
183. Id. at 39-42; 47-65.
184. Blanchard, supra note 7, at 19 (alteration added).
185. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(alteration added).
186. The journalism profession has accepted standards of practice that are
generally in line with the constitutional role of the press in the democratic process.
See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
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approach is misplaced in this context. As an integral part of our
democratic process, the news media should be given a more concrete
explanation of the expectations society places on them. The failure to
develop a reliable standard creates a risk that judges' personal views will
lead to uncertainty and a lack of institutional respect for the role the news
media serve. Creating a standard by which the media can assert their
First Amendment protections in a variety of situations will help to
correct such problems and better protect competing public interests.
3. A New Test
In evaluating grand jury subpoenas seeking to identify sources of
government leaks to reporters, courts should adopt a test that
incorporates and builds upon the tradition that the First Amendment
provides heightened press protections for responsible exercise of
journalism. When a reporter has acted responsibly, she should be able to
assert privileges rooted in the First Amendment beyond the almost
universal prohibition against prior restraints. These privileges should
then be balanced against competing governmental interests, placing the
burden on the government to demonstrate that its interests require
compelled disclosure of the source on a case-by-case basis.
Step 1: Did the reporter act responsibly?
Under the first prong of this test, the court should ask whether
the reporter has acted as a reasonable reporter would in similar
circumstances. There are various considerations that would play into
such a determination. First, the court should consider whether the
reporting served a public good. Because the primary purpose behind the
Press Clause seems to be fostering democratic participation through an
informed electorate,187 providing information that is consistent with that
purpose serves the public good. The reasonable journalist will always
keep in mind that she, like government, is charged with serving the
public. Adopting the view that a free news media operates like a fourth
branch in the system of checks and balances places reciprocal
responsibilities on the media.
187. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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In applying the reasonableness standard, courts can also look to
the ethical codes of the journalism profession. These codes tend to focus
on the role of the news media in fostering public participation in the
democratic process, and their goals as outlined tend to be in line with the
role of the press that has been articulated by the courts. 188 Using the
profession's own codes of ethics would eliminate some of the courts'
past reliance on subjective personal opinion and would avoid the
problem of having the government be the sole determinant of what
constitutes a responsible journalistic check on its power. Because
journalism is an activity that enjoys constitutional protection under the
First Amendment, the government would carry the burden of showing
that the reporter acted irresponsibly and thus should be stripped of her
heightened First Amendment protections. If the government meets this
burden, the reporter would not be able to assert a First Amendment
privilege against compelled disclosure. The reporter would then face a
choice common to anyone subpoenaed by a grand jury: cooperate with
the government or face the penalties of being held in contempt of court.
However, if the court determines that the reporter acted
responsibly, she would then be able to assert a limited privilege against
compelled disclosure. This limited privilege would protect the reporter's
First Amendment rights, while still allowing the government to compel
disclosure in limited circumstances where the governmental interest in
disclosure outweighs the public interest in unimpeded newsgathering.
This determination can be achieved by the court balancing the competing
interests at stake.
188. The Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) encourages its members to
seek truth and report it, minimize harm to individuals, act independently and be
accountable for their reporting. SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, CODE OF
ETHICS (1996), available at http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp?. Both the American
Society of Newspaper Editors' Statement of Principles, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
NEWSPAPER EDITORS, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1996), available at
http://www.asne.org/kiosk/archive/principl.htm, and the Radio-Television News
Directors Association's Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct, RADIO-
TELEVISION NEWS DIRECTORS ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT (2000), available at http://www.rtnda.org/ethics/coe.shtml, promote
similar goals, including truth, fairness, independence, and responsibility or
accountability.
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Step 2: Balancing competing interests.
First, on one side of the scales, determine the public interest in
allowing the reporter to assert the privilege. The court would first look
at the public interests served by the First Amendment protections
asserted by the reporter. In the context of government leak
investigations, the high bar set by Branzburg for demonstrating a
resulting chilling effect should be lowered because the likelihood of such
chilling and its potential harm are heightened. When the source is a
government official, the public interest in the information is more closely
tied to the purposes of the First Amendment than when the source is a
private actor. For example, the information provided by the sources in
the various Branzburg cases bore a much more tenuous connection to the
government's performance than did the information provided to Judith
Miller and her colleagues in the Miller case. Information provided by
government sources enables the public to make informed decisions at the
ballot box. When the information is more valuable to the public, the
potential harm of a chilling effect on the public interest is much higher.
As the government is seeking to burden the reporter's First Amendment
rights, it should be required to demonstrate that the chilling effect would
be insubstantial. Furthermore, placing the burden on the reporters would
be unfair because there is no way for a reporter to forecast with any
certainty the level of damage done to her ability to gather news.
Moreover, the real danger is not in the adverse impact on the individual
reporter's ability to gather news; rather, it is the cumulative effect that
chilling will have on newsgathering in general that poses a real threat to
the flow of information to the public. 189
In evaluating the public interest in protecting the reporter's First
Amendment privilege, the court should also determine how much
potential harm would be done to the public's informed decisions
regarding its government if newsgathering and reporting of the particular
type of information at issue would be chilled. Where the information
concerns the government's effectiveness in protecting national security,
189. See supra note 118 (demonstrating that the Miller decision led several
government sources to be more hesitant before talking to reporters who were not
involved in the earlier litigation).
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the harm done to the public by chilling such information would be at its
greatest.
Second, on the other side of the scales, determine the
government's interest in compelling disclosure. The court would then
balance these public interests in protecting the reporter's First
Amendment source privilege against the governmental interest in
locating the source of its leak. Because the reporter will have already
established a constitutional interest on the other side of the scales, the
government must now demonstrate an interest for requiring disclosure of
the source that outweighs the asserted First Amendment interests. Where
the government's interest is less important-such as maintaining control
of government employees or punishing an employee-the reporter's First
Amendment rights would weigh more heavily. In proving an overriding
interest, the government must present evidence that establishes the
interest and cannot rely on mere assertions that its interest is more
important. Using this evidence, the court will then determine whether
the government's proferred interest in locating the source outweighs the
potential harm to newsgathering as earlier identified. Like any
balancing, this will require a judgment call by the court; but factual
considerations-such as whether the government could locate the source
without the reporter's cooperation-will determine the outcome. Where
the court determines that the First Amendment interests take precedence,
the reporter would not be required to disclose the identity of her source.
However, where the court determines that the government interests take
precedence, the reporter would be required to cooperate with the
government.
The value of this test is that it gives weight to the important
goals of the Press Clause where courts have sometimes disregarded its
importance. At the same time, the test acknowledges that there are
instances when First Amendment goals must give way to overriding
governmental interests. Applying the test to the Miller and New York
Times cases offers a concrete example of how it works and why it better
serves the public interests at play.
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE NEW TEST TO THE JUDITH MILLER CASES
A. In Re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller
Pursuant to the new test outlined above, it would be important
for a court undertaking the responsibility inquiry to recognize that neither
Judith Miller nor Matthew Cooper reported the information regarding
Plame's identity before Robert Novak's column ran. 90 Assuming for the
moment that (1) the act of leaking the fact that Wilson's wife worked at
the CIA was criminal, (2) the source of the leak was within the
government, and (3) public disclosure of the fact would endanger Plame
and/or American intelligence operations, Miller and Cooper have a
stronger argument than Novak for invoking First Amendment
protections.
Although Novak was not a party to the case, applying the test to
his reporting illustrates the importance of the responsibility inquiry. If
the government presented evidence that showed that public identification
of Plame as a CIA agent endangered national security, there is a good
argument that Novak was irresponsible in naming Plame by name.
Identifying a CIA agent might have been unreasonable for Novak
because it might have harmed both Plame's personal interests as well as
important governmental interests in maintaining effective intelligence
operations. Furthermore, if the leak were merely part of a smear
campaign and Novak knew or should have known that, his reporting
might violate ethical standards of fairness and impartiality. It is harder to
argue that Miller and Cooper acted irresponsibly. More likely, the
caution they exercised by refraining from publishing the information
they received was likely reasonable if one assumes that publication could
have endangered American interests.
In any event, the government would have the burden of proving
irresponsibility through direct evidence. Much of the evidence that
Judge Tatel cited in his balancing test in the Miller case is unconvincing.
He often relied on media reports and implication. Judge Tatel's basis for
the fact that Plame was a covert agent was a Washington Post article' 9 '
190. See supra note 67.
191. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1178-79 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., concurring). Judge Tatel noted that the leaks in question were
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and testimony that a CIA spokesperson had told Robert Novak that
publication of Plame's name "'might be embarrassing" if she were to
later travel overseas. 192 Judge Tatel believed that the latter statement
"strongly implies Plame was covert at least at some point.' , 193
Furthermore, he made clear that while Special Counsel Fitzgerald
asserted that Plame's identity was protected by the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act, Fitzgerald never actually provided evidentiary support• . 194
for that proposition. As to whether Novak knowingly took part in a
partisan smear campaign, it would weigh in Novak's favor that he first
verified the information with the CIA. Novak has stated publicly that he
"never would have written those sentences if [CIA spokesman] Harlow,
then-CIA Director George Tenet or anybody else from the agency had
told me that Valerie Plame Wilson's disclosure would endanger herself
or anybody. ' 95 Furthermore, one would reasonably expect the CIA to
have responded more forcefully in discouraging the publication if true
national security interests were at stake.
There is even less evidence that Miller and Cooper acted
irresponsibly. While Miller learned the information from her source in
"a serious matter." Id. He indicated that "Plame evidently traveled overseas on
clandestine missions beginning nearly two decades ago," information which he cited
to a Washington Post article, and thus concluded that her covert activities as well as
that of her associates may have been compromised by the leak. Id. He later
indicated that "[w]hile another case might require more specific evidence that a leak
harmed national security," in this case it was sufficient that the CIA seemed to have
strongly implied to Novak that Plame was covert at some point in time. Id. at 1182
(alteration added).
192. Id. at 1182 (Tatel, J., concurring).
193. Id. (Tatel, J., concurring).
194. Id. Judge Tatel stated: "[T]he special counsel refers to Plame as a
'person whose identity the CIA was making specific efforts to conceal and who had
carried out covert work overseas within the last 5 years'-representations I trust the
special counsel would not make without support." Id. (alteration added).
195. Robert Novak, Op.-Ed., The allegation against me is so incorrect I feel
constrained to reply, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Aug. 1, 2005, at 41 (alteration added). Novak
further stated that the CIA spokesman had told him "she probably never again would
be given a foreign assignment but that exposure of her name might cause
'difficulties,' [and that] [a]ccording to CIA sources, she was brought home from
foreign assignments in 1997, when agency officials feared she had been 'outed' by
the traitor Aldrich Ames." Id. (alterations added).
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the course of an interview, she never used the information.196 Cooper
ultimately published a story regarding his source's disclosure of Plame's
identity, but he did not do so until after Plame's identity had already been
made public through Novak's column. 197 The caution Miller and Cooper
exercised by refraining from publishing the information seems
reasonable, especially if one accepts that publication could have
endangered American interests.
After determining that Miller and her colleagues acted
responsibly, the court would need to balance the public interest in
newsgathering and reporting of information relating to America's
national security efforts against the government's interest in compelling
disclosure of the source. In Miller, the information leaked was part of a
much bigger news story and escalating public debate. When viewed in
isolation, the fact that Wilson's wife worked at the CIA may seem
relatively unimportant. However, its true importance stems from its role
in the narrative of the Iraq War and the broader context of the state of
America's efforts to improve national security. Following the September
11 th terrorist attacks, public debate focused on the intelligence failures
that may have contributed to the success of the attacks. 198 Understanding
how American intelligence agencies learned of and reacted to the
terrorist threat was an important part of evaluating whether the
government responded to the attacks effectively. 199 Furthermore, there
196. This raises the question as to how the special prosecutor even knew that
Plame's identity had been disclosed to Miller. As the government must have had
some source for that information, it seems possible that it did not need Miller's
testimony in order to obtain the information it was seeking.
197. In fact, Cooper testified that he first learned Plame's name either from
Novak's column or by searching for her on the Internet. Cooper, supra note 76.
198. See, e.g., The News Hour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast Dec.
11, 2002), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/congress/july-dec02/intelli
gence_12-11.html (highlighting a discussion between senators on the 9/11
Commission Report examining intelligence failures that contributed to the success of
the September 11 th attacks).
199. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (Official
Government Edition), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/91 1/pdf/fullreport.pdf
(last visited Mar. 29, 2007) (detailing the events that led up to the September 11 th
attacks and offering recommendations to prevent such attacks in the future). In
explaining the importance of its report, the Commission stated:
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was widespread debate over the propriety of invading Iraq and
overthrowing Saddam Hussein. 200 Joseph Wilson's op-ed 20 1 lent
credence to the claims that the Bush administration had purposely misled
the public. Information relating to Wilson's credibility thus gave the
public an important basis for judging the value that should have been
given to the administration's claims. Given the high governmental
interest in continued and effective national security, great weight should
be put on the side of the scales protecting the reporters' ability to
maintain confidentiality. By forcing disclosure, the government could
likely cut off the flow of information that would allow the public to
evaluate the effectiveness of American intelligence operations.
Without access to the evidence presented by the government in
the Miller case, it is hard to determine how much weight the
government's asserted interest in protecting national security should be
given. It is possible that the D.C. Circuit got it right. However, the court
offered no concrete explanation of why the evidence favored the
At the outset of our work, we said we were looking
backward in order to look forward. We hope that the
terrible losses chronicled in this report can create
something positive-an America that is safer, stronger, and
wiser. That September day, we came together as a nation.
The test before us is to sustain that unity of purpose and
meet the challenges now confronting us.
Id. at xvi.
200. See, e.g., John F. Dickerson and Karen Tumulty, The Love Him, Hate
Him President, TIME, Dec. 1, 2003, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine
/article/0,9171,1006297-1,00.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2007) (examining the deep
division of feelings among citizens about President George W. Bush and his
policies). The authors state:
Just as the country can't bring the war in Iraq to a tidy
conclusion, it can't declare a truce over the fact that Bush
took us there. For those who support him, the policy of
pre-emptive engagement is the ultimate sign of his
visionary grasp of what is needed to fight and win the war
on terror .... For the increasing numbers who have doubts
about the original mission to Iraq . . . Bush's policy was
driven by everything from a thirst for oil to a crusading
interventionist zeal.
Id. at4.
201. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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government, opting instead to hold that Branzburg pre-empted all claims
of First Amendment protections for journalists in the grand jury
context.202 It is possible that the government's interest here was high
indeed. If public disclosure of Plame's identity compromised ongoing
American intelligence efforts, the government likely had a need to ferret
out the sources of the leak in order to prevent such irresponsible leaking
in the future. However, the government should have been required to
prove that the leak itself was dangerous in order to demonstrate that it
had an overriding interest in locating the source of the leak.
B. New York Times v. Gonzales
The same test can be applied to the New York Times case.
Beginning with the responsibility inquiry, the reporters here seem much
less likely to be able to invoke First Amendment privileges than those in
the Miller case. To begin, it is difficult to identify the public good served
by Miller's and Shenon's reporting. While accepting the premise that the
information in Miller's first story (published before the raid)2°3 educated
the public about ongoing American efforts to thwart terrorist activities,
the reporters unreasonably alerted charities with suspected terrorist ties
to impending government raids. That same information would have been
just as available the next day, following the government raid. The
government could persuasively argue that by notifying the charities and
reporting the day before the raid the journalists actually endangered the
general welfare. Furthermore, applying journalistic ethical standards
would give the government a good argument that the reporters had
deviated from the norms of responsible reporting. Miller and Shenon
were no longer independent reporters but had inserted themselves as
participants in the news story. The American Society of Newspaper
Editors' standard of responsibility states:
The primary purpose of gathering and distributing
news and opinion is to serve the general welfare by
informing the people and enabling them to make
judgments on the issues of the time.
202. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1149 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
203. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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Newspapermen and women who abuse the power
of their professional role for selfish motives or
unworthy purposes are faithless to that public
trust.
2 04
There is evidence to support an inference that Miller and Shenon
acted for an unworthy purpose by alerting the charities of the impending
government raids. Such interference in a government investigation is
unwarranted and irresponsible. There appears to be little news value in
obtaining comment from the charities before the government acted,
rather than simply waiting twenty-four hours, until after the government
had acted. Furthermore, the reporters could have endangered federal
agents-and ultimately the American public-by thwarting an
investigation into alleged terrorist activities.
With the government likely able to meet its burden of showing
the reporters acted irresponsibly, Miller and Shenon would not able to
assert First Amendment source protection, as they were no longer
serving their constitutionally protected function under the Press Clause.
Thus, the court would have no need to balance the governmental interests
in compelled disclosure against the public interest in protecting the
reporters' First Amendment privilege. Note that the New York Times
decision seems to reflect much of this thinking already. Having placed
205such emphasis on the irresponsible behavior of the reporters, the. . 206
Second Circuit's apparent lack of sympathy for press protections may
in fact be reflective of a belief that Miller and Shenon should be forced to
reveal their sources, having failed to act responsibly with the information
they had obtained.
CONCLUSION
The future of a First Amendment confidential source privilege
lies in the hands of the Supreme Court, but the Court has yet to clarify or
reconsider its holding in Branzburg. Since Branzburg was decided over
thirty years ago, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia now offer
either a statutory or common law privilege to reporters in such
204. See ASNE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 188.
205. See supra notes 92-93.




situations. And even when presented with an issue upon which the
circuit courts have somewhat split-as most circuits recognize some type
of privilege to shield confidential sources but offer "little agreement to
the extent of the privilege"208-the Supreme Court declined to grant
Judith Miller's and Matthew Cooper's petitions for certiorari. Prominent
attorney Floyd Abrams argued in the early 1980s that the Burger Court
(which decided Branzburg) routinely refused to hear press cases in which
the press had lost in the lower courts, thereby limiting the scope of the
209debate considerably. This trend may continue with the current Court.
By passing on the issues decided so contentiously in Branzburg, the
Court has left the analysis to the lower courts where certainty is more
210difficult to come by.
However, the news media should not necessarily be disheartened
by the Court's decision not to take the Miller case. Decisions handed
down in today's climate of distrust of the news media will serve as
precedent for future decisions. 21 Here it becomes evident that the media
has an important role to play in refraining the public debate over the
level of constitutional protection it deserves. For a variety of reasons,
both the government and society have grown increasingly skeptical of
212the media and its motives. The media need to address these concerns
207. Miller, 438 F.3d at 1170 (Tatel, J., concurring).
208. Bill Kenworthy, First Amendment Center, Branzburg v. Hayes, reporters'
privilege & circuit courts, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=
15525 (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
209. Floyd Abrams, The Burger Court and the First Amendment. Putting a
Decade into Perspective, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED 139, supra note
7.
210. See id. at 143.
211. See, e.g., Mark Jurkowitz, Public's cynicism about media has become a
pressing concern, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 14, 2004, at C 1, available at http://www.bos
ton.com/news/globe/living/articles/2004/04/14/publics-cynicismaboutmedia-has
become_a_pressingconcern/.
212. Id. While pundits on both sides decry the media's perceived liberal bias
or conservative bias, some studies suggest that public dissatisfaction with the media
stems from something else:
What people often mean when they say the press is biased
in its political reporting is that it is biased toward its own
self-interest. The media are seen as exploitive, as
needlessly stirring political controversy and offering too
much contentious punditry. Surveys taken for the ASNE
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head on. By re-engaging and earning the trust of the public through
increased diversity of viewpoints, greater focus on the reporting of
details instead of summarizing information, decreased emphasis on
corporate culture, and dedication to independent, unbiased reporting, the
media has the power to reframe its constitutional role in our society.
Since the September 1 th attacks, the government has understandably
focused on national security and moved towards greater protection of
classified information. The press must demonstrate, both to the public
and to the government, that its goals are not inconsistent with the
government's national security goals. If the press fails to do so, it is
unlikely that courts will dramatically change their current analysis of
First Amendment press protection.
By the same token, judicial adoption of the theory that the First
Amendment offers its greatest protection to press activities that
responsibly fulfill the media's role in the democratic process could
combat some of the problems raised in the current analysis of press
freedoms. If the courts begin rewarding responsible journalism that
promotes the goals of the democratic process, they could encourage more
media outlets to focus their efforts on promoting public participation and
civic responsibility. Thus, the courts also have a role in encouraging the
system to operate as the Founding Fathers envisioned-where a free
media fosters educated participation of the electorate in our government.
Over thirty years ago, Justice Powell noted in his dissent to the
Branzburg decision: "In the event of a subpoena, under today's decision,
the newsman will know that he must choose between being punished for
contempt if he refuses to testify, or violating his profession's ethics and
impairing his resourcefulness as a reporter if he discloses confidential
,,2 13information. Judith Miller can certainly attest to truth of his remarks.
The test now for both the courts and the media is to change the
adversarial nature of their relationship and put the public's interests first.
Journalism Credibility Project in 1998 found that 71
percent thought that the cause of bias in television news
was a desire for higher ratings, while only 10 percent
thought it was due to political bias. Similar answers were
given about bias in newspapers.
Andrew Kohut, Listen Up, Bias Mongers! The Audience Doesn't Agree, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REv. 68 (Mar.-Apr. 2002).
213. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 731-32 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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